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et al.: Workers' Compensation Law

WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
I.

COURT PERMITS STATUTORY EMPLOYEES TO BE COUNTED FOR
JURISDICTIONAL PURPOSES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES

In Ost v. Integrated Products, Inc.1 the South Carolina Supreme
Court enlarged the jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Commission, particularly with regard to small businesses.
Ost was a pilot employed by Integrated Products, Inc. (Integrated), a Georgia corporation engaged in the manufacture of yarn.'
Integrated conducted business in South Carolina through three employees who regularly traveled to South Carolina in the course of their
employment. A second Georgia corporation, National Sales Company,
Inc. (National), a sister company to Integrated, provided a three-person sales force to sell Integrated's yarn in South Carolina. National
made frequent use of Integrated's plane and pilot 3 and had an employee, Nolan, aboard the airplane when it crashed in Greenville
County on January 17, 1984. Both Nolan and Ost, the pilot, died as a
result of the crash.On appeal from a circuit court order affirming the Commission's
award of death benefits, the supreme court considered the following
two issues: (1) whether the National salesmen were statutory employees of Integrated; and (2) whether statutory employees may be included to meet the jurisdictional requirement that before an employer
may be subject to the Workers' Compensation Act,5 the employer must
have no less than four employees regularly employed in the state.6
Integrated sought to prevent an inquiry into the application of the
statutory employees section. It argued that because it employed less
than four employees in South Carolina, it was presumptively exempt
from the Workers' Compensation Act under Nolan v. National Sales
Co.7 The court rejected Integrated's argument because in Nolan the

1. 296 S.C. 241, 371 S.E.2d 796 (1988).
2. Record at 32-33.
3. Ost, 296 S.C. at 247, 371 S.E.2d at 799. National had an informal lease arrangement with Integrated, characterized as "a handshake between the two companies," for
the use of the plane. Record at 99.
4. Ost, 296 S.C. at 243, 371 S.E.2d at 797.
5. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1-10 to -19-50 (Law. Co-op 1976 & Supp. 1988).
6. Id. § 42-1-360(2) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
7. 292 S.C. 1, 354 S.E.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 294 S.C. 371, 364 S.E.2d 752
(1988). This case resulted from the same plane crash when Nolan's survivors brought
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plaintiffs tried to amalgamate the employees of Integrated, the contractor, in order to meet the number of subcontractor employees necessary for jurisdiction. Conversely, in Ost the plaintiffs sought to include
employees of the subcontractor to increase the number of employees
attributable to the contractor. 8
Once past the presumptive exemption holding of Nolan, the court
applied the familiar test from Marchbanks v. Duke Power Co.9 and its
progeny to determine whether the National salesmen could be considered statutory employees of Integrated, the primary employer. Although it indicated that no hard and fast rule could be formulated and
that each case must be evaluated on its own facts,' 0 the court sought to
determine whether the employees of National were engaged in an activity that was a necessary and essential part of the trade or business
of Integrated." The court readily found sales to be an important part
of the business of a yarn manufacturer and
concluded that the Na12
tional salesmen were statutory employees.
The court then turned to the second, and perhaps more important,
issue of the case: whether statutory employees may be "stacked" to
reach the four employee jurisdictional requirement of South Carolina
Code section 42-1-360(2).13 The court began its analysis by stating the
general purpose of the statutory employee provision of the Workers'
Compensation Act:
"It was evidently realized by the General Assembly that it would not
be fair to relieve the owner of compensation to employees doing work
which was part of his trade or business by permitting such owner to
sublet or subcontract some part of said work. Doubtless in many instances such contractor would be financially irresponsible, or the
number of employees under him would be so small ....

that such

contractor would not be required under the Act to carry compensation
insurance. It was therefore, provided under the first paragraph that
where such work in which the employee was engaged was a part of the
owner's trade or business, the owner would be responsible in compensation to all employees doing such work, whether employees on an independent contractor or not."1'

suit against National.
8. Ost, 296 S.C. at 243-44, 371 S.E.2d at 798.

9. 190 S.C. 336, 2 S.E.2d 825 (1939).
10. See Ost, 296 S.C. at 244-46, 371 S.E.2d at 798-99 (noting the various tests from
Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1, 132 S.E.2d 18 (1963); Boseman v. Pacific

Mills, 193 S.C. 479, 8 S.E.2d 878 (1940); and Marchbanks, 190 S.C. 336, 2 S.E.2d 825).
11. Id. at 246, 371 S.E.2d at 799.
12. Id.
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-360(2) (Law Co-op. 1976).
14. Ost, 296 S.C. at 247, 371 S.E.2d at 800 (quoting Marchbanks, 190 S.C. at 344, 2
S.E.2d at 828).
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Most of the cases in which section 42-1-360(2) has been applied,
however, have involved claimants who were themselves subcontractors.
Thus, the statutory employee section seems most applicable to these
claimants. In Ost the claimant was not a subcontractor, but a regular
employee of the principal employer who sought to amalgamate nonemployees to avail himself of compensation benefits. Even though the
Marchbanks rational quoted by the court in Ost seems sufficiently
broad to address this situation, the facts of Ost are not typical of most
statutory employee cases. 15
The court concluded that the policy of resolving doubt in favor of
coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act supported the inclu16
sion of statutory employees of Integrated for purposes of jurisdiction.
A similar result reached by the Virginia Court of Appeals was persuasive. 17 That court reasoned that to disallow stacking would lead to evasion of compensation liability. It stated, "'If a subcontractor's employees were not considered in determining the contractor's exemption
under the Act, the work could simply be subdivided among different
contracting entities to evade liability under the Act.' "18
The narrowing of the exemption provision of South Carolina Code
section 42-1-360(2) is not surprising in light of the court's preference
for coverage. Moreover, Ost could indicate the first step toward judicial
agreement with states that have done away with jurisdictional minimurs.' 9 While the abolition of such a requirement would, of course, be
the province of the General Assembly, the court's attitude toward the
provision would be persuasive in the General Assembly's decision. The
result in Ost, however, is unusual when compared with the contrary
outcome of Nolan, since the respective claimants died in the same

15. See, e.g., Boseman v. Pacific Mills, 193 S.C. 479, 8 S.E.2d 878 (1940) (painting
contractor injured); Hairston v. Re: Leasing, Inc., 286 S.C. 493, 334 S.E.2d 825 (Ct. App.
1985) (truck driver held statutory employee of contracting dealership).
16. See Ost, 296 S.C. at 248, 371 S.E.2d at 800.
17. Smith v. Weber, 3 Va. App. 379, 350 S.E.2d 213 (1986). After concluding the
claimant and other subcontractors were statutory employees of the principal, the Vir-

ginia court stated, "Thus the subcontractor's employees are employees of the contractor
for purposes of liability. Since they are the contractor's employees for purposes of determining liability, reason dictates that they should also be considered employees for determining applicability of the [Workers' Compensation] Act." Id. at -, 350 S.E.2d at 214.
18. Id. at -, 350 S.E.2d at 214, quoted in Ost, 296 S.C. at 248, 371 S.E.2d at 800.
19. Only twelve states have numerical minimum statutes. In all other jurisdictions
employers are within the coverage of their respective workers' compensation acts if they
have even one employee. 1C A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 52.10 (1986).
Professor Larson points out that only two states have held that statutory employees are

not to be included in the minimum employee calculation. He notes that the contrary,
more liberal view is more effective in carrying out the goals of statutory employee legislation. Id. § 52.32.
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crash.20 Still, the Ost holding furthers the goal of assuring compensation for injured employees as embodied in the Workers' Compensation
Act.
Weyman C. Carter

II.

MENTAL-MENTAL INJURIES HELD COMPENSABLE UNDER WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT

In Stokes v. First National Bank21 the South Carolina Court of
Appeals extended the definition of a "compensable injury" to include
nervous breakdowns and subsequent mental injuries resulting from
mental and emotional stress associated with working conditions.22
Prior to Stokes, workers' compensation benefits in South Carolina had
been awarded for work-related emotional illnesses only when they resulted from physical injuries.2 s The Stokes court, however, refused to
distinguish mental-mental injuries from physical-mental injuries.2"
Daniel Stokes was a vice president of the First National Bank in
Columbia, South Carolina. Stokes' work hours increased significantly
during 1984 because of an anticipated merger with South Carolina National Bank. In January Stokes was working approximately forty-five
hours per week. By November his workload had increased to between
112 and 126 hours per week. Testimony at trial showed that the merger
generated too much work for the few people
able to do it. Stokes was
25
burdened with much of the extra work.

The merger was completed as scheduled on December 1, 1984.
Stokes worked until December 9, 1984, when he was hospitalized for a
nervous breakdown. Stokes attempted to return to work in January

20. The claimant in Nolan argued that the employer and carrier should be es-

topped from denying coverage under the Act because of the existence of a multistate
endorsement in the employer's policy. The court of appeals refused to adopt this position in the absence of a statutory estoppel rule. See Nolan v. National Sales Co., 292 S.C.
1, 4-5, 354 S.E.2d 575, 577 (Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 294 S.C. 371, 364 S.E.2d 752 (1988).

The result would be different today. The South Carolina General Assembly has amended
the Workers' Compensation Act by adding section 45-5-80(c), which provides: "Any insurer who issues a policy of compensation insurance to an employer not subject to this
title may not plead as a defense that the employer is not subject to this title and is
estopped to deny coverage." S.C. CODE AN. § 42-5-80(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
21. 298 S.C. 13, 377 S.E.2d 922 (Ct. App. 1988).

22. Id. at 14, 377 S.E.2d at 923.
23. See Kennedy v. Williamsburg County, 242 S.C. 477, 131 S.E.2d 512 (1963).

24. Stokes, 299 S.C. at 22-23, 377 S.E.2d at 927. Mental-mental injuries are mental
disorders resulting from mental stimuli. Id. at 14-15, 377 S.E.2d at 922-23. Physicalmental injuries are those resulting from physical stimuli. See id.
25. See id. at 15-16, 377 S.E.2d at 923.
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1985, but he was fired. Subsequently, Stokes accepted employment
paying $14,000 per year less than his position with First National
Bank. Evidence indicated that Stokes was permanently disabled and
unable to return to a position comparable to his previous job. The
Workers' Compensation Commissioner found that Stokes suffered a
fifty percent permanent partial disability from a bodily injury. The full
Commission and the circuit court affirmed the order2 6
On appeal the court's analysis began with the evolution of the
term "accident" in workers' compensation law. "Accident," for compensation purposes, means an untoward, unexpected event causing injury.27 The court stated that external force, violence or wounds are not
essential, thus indicating that the unexpected resulting injury is itself
compensable.28 The court stated that "[t]he term accident relates not
only to the dynamics of the occurrence causing the injury but also to
the injury itself. ' 29 The court of appeals, for purposes of compensation,
equated mental injury cases with heart attack cases. 30 In heart attack
cases, South Carolina courts have affirmed compensation awards when
or by unthe injury resulted from "unexpected strain or overexertion
'31
usual or extraordinaryconditions of employment.
In Yates v. Life Insurance Co. of Georgia32 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals denied compensation to a claimant who attempted
suicide because of job related activities. 3 3 The court held the mental
disorder was not compensable because it was the result of normal
working conditions3 4 Under those circumstances, no "accident" occurred as defined by the law.3 5
Noting that a majority of jurisdictions compensate mental-mental
injuries, the court concluded that mental-mental injuries would be
compensable if the mental disorder was the result of unusual or extraordinary working conditions.3 The Commission found Stokes'
mental disorder to be the result of extraordinary working conditions.3
Applying the new rule, the court found Stokes' injuries to be

26. Id. at 15, 377 S.E.2d at 923-24.
27. Id. at 17, 377 S.E.2d at 924.
28. See id. (citing Hiers v. Brunson Constr. Co., 221 S.C. 212, 70 S.E.2d 211
(1952)).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 18, 377 S.E.2d at 925.
31. Id. at 18-19, 377 S.E.2d at 925 (citing Kearse v. South Carolina Wildlife Resources Dep't, 236 S.C. 540, 546-47, 115 S.E.2d 183, 186-87 (1960)).
32. 291 S.C. 301, 353 S.E.2d 297 (Ct. App. 1987).

33. See id. at 306, 353 S.E.2d at 300.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. Stokes, 298 S.C. at 21, 377 S.E.2d at 926.

37. Id.
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compensable.3 8
The court found further support for its holding in the social policy
behind workers' compensation. It stated that the Workers' Compensation Act was designed to protect employees from the hazards of employ nent, and that the Act is to be applied liberally, affording the
claimant the greatest possible benefits.3 9 The court determined that
the purpose of the Act could not be fulfilled by allowing compensation
for mental disorders caused by physical stress while disallowing com40
pensation for those caused by mental stress.
The court of appeals' analysis and holding are both logical and
complete. Compensating a claimant for mental injuries resulting from
extraordinary work-related stimuli is a logical progression from the
compensation afforded claimants who suffer heart attacks resulting
from the same unusual working stimuli.
The court's holding, however, raises a difficult question: When do
circumstances become so unusual or extraordinary that compensation
for injuries is appropriate? The line between slightly strenuous working conditions, and those that reach the level of "unusual" and "extraordinary," is not well defined. The court stated in Stokes that "[flor
a number of years unusual and excessively long work schedules have
41
been recognized as unusual and extraordinary working conditions."1

This statement contemplates a comparison between the claimant's normal hourly schedule and the hourly schedule immediately preceding
the accident. Such a quantitative test, standing alone, could result in
unjust and overly narrow decisions if courts are not careful to consider
also the level of stress associated with the work.
In heart attack cases courts have factored in the qualitative aspects of the claimants' working conditions, such as stress, physical exertion and time pressures. 42 Unfortunately, although this type of analysis may result in more compassionate holdings, the vagueness of the
test may lead to uncertainty and confusion.
If, however, courts were to require strictly that a claimant work a
particular number of overtime hours before compensation could be
given, employees mentally or emotionally injured by conditions not involving excessive hours would be unfairly excluded. Thus, the current
rule, if unclear, at least is flexible. Commissioners can analyze each sit-

38. See id.
39. Id. at 21-22, 377 S.E.2d at 926-27 (citing Taylor v. Mount Vernon-Woodberry
Mills, 211 S.C. 414, 45 S.E.2d 809 (1947); Cokely v. Robert Lee, Inc., 197 S.C. 157, 14
S.E.2d 889 (1941)).

40. Id. at 22, 377 S.E.2d at 927.
41. Id. at 19, 377 S.E.2d at 925.
42. See McWhorter v. South Carolina Dep't of Ins., 252 S.C. 90, 165 S.E.2d 365
(1969); Brown v. La France Indus., 286 S.C. 319, 333 S.E.2d 348 (Ct. App. 1985).
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uation and determine if the work environment and conditions were
sufficiently strenuous to support an award of compensation for a resulting mental injury.
The court of appeals' decision in Stokes is a sensible extension of
existing South Carolina law. Allowing compensation for mental-mental
injuries is a logical progression from compensating heart attack victims
whose complications were caused by extraordinary conditions of employment. Clearly, the difficulty courts will face in future cases will
concern determinations of what types of stressful working conditions
are sufficiently "extraordinary" to merit compensation.
Sandra M. Harlen
III. WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIM BARRED BY EMPLOYEE'S
ELECTION TO SUE THIRD PARTY WITHOUT NOTICE TO EMPLOYER

The South Carolina Court of Appeals addressed the multifaceted
purpose of workers' compensation law in Hudson v. Townsend Saw
Chain Co. 43 The court held that an employee who pursued a thirdparty tort action without notifying either the Commission, her employer, or the employer's insurance carrier of the lawsuit had elected
her remedy by operation of South Carolina Code section 42-1-560(b). 4"
In barring the employee from making a workers' compensation claim,
the court of appeals limited the judicial policy of construing workers'
compensation law in favor of the worker and ruled as to when election
of remedies would be applied. This question had earlier been left unan45
swered in Johnson v. Pennsylvania Millers Mutual Insurance Co.

43. 296 S.C. 17, 370 S.E.2d 104 (Ct. App. 1988).
44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-560(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976). This section provides in relevant part:
The injured employee ...
shall be entitled to receive the compensation and
other benefits provided by this Title and to enforce by appropriate proceedings

his... rights against the third party; [and]... the carrier shall have a lien
on the proceeds of any recovery from the third party .... Notice of the commencement of the action shall be given within thirty days thereafter to the
[Workers' Compensation] Commission, the employer and carrier upon a form
prescribed by the [Workers' Compensation] Commission.

Id.
45. 292 S.C. 33, 40, 354 S.E.2d 791, 795 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that sections 42-1550 and 42-1-560 cannot bar relief under the doctrine of election of remedies "when an
injured employee has given the carrier proper notice of the third-party action). Although
the Johnson court indicated in dicta that settlement with a third party tortfeasor without consultation with the employer would have barred a subsequent workers' compensa-

tion claim, it did not address situations in which proper notice of the suit had not been
given at all. See id. at 39, 354 S.E.2d at 794.
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The Hudson court emphasized that workers' compensation law is
intended to protect not only the employee, but also the employer and
its insurance carrier."' The court stated that its holding was consistent
with the supreme court's decision in Fisher v. South CarolinaDepartment of Mental Retardation,47 in which Justice Ness noted that a
claimant "violates the spirit of the act"48 when he disregards the subrogation rights of his employer's insurance carrier.49
The case arose when Lelia Hudson was struck by an automobile in
her employer's parking lot. Although she notified her employer, Townsend Saw Chain Co. (Townsend), of her injury, she failed to provide
the required notice within 30 days of the commencement of her lawsuit
against the driver. Following a jury verdict for the defendant, Hudson
filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The Workers' Com-

pensation Commission found that "Hudson's prosecution of the thirdparty action to a final determination constituted an election of remedies that barred her claim to workers' compensation." 50 The circuit
court vacated the Commission's order, but the court of appeals reinstated the original determination that an election of remedies had been
made."
The primary issue decided in Hudson was whether the notice requirement of section 42-1-560(b) applies to all cases, or only to those in
which the workers' compensation claim and the third-party action are
pursued simultaneously. The circuit court relied exclusively on section
42-1-550,52 which permits an employee to prosecute an action against a
third person to a final determination before a workers' compensation
award is made.3

The court of appeals disagreed, noting that the South Carolina Supreme Court had identified the "'equitable adjustment of the rights of
all the parties' "54 as the primary purpose of section 42-1-560."5 Therefore, the court reasoned, section 42-1-550 must be read with reference
to the notice requirement of section 42-1-560.5
In Fisher the plaintiff attempted to pursue a workers' compensa-

46. See Hudson, 296 S.C. at 22, 370 S.E.2d at 107-08.

47. 277 S.C. 573, 291 S.E.2d 200 (1982).
48. Id. at 576, 291 S.E.2d at 201.
49. Hudson, 296 S.C. at 21, 370 S.E.2d at 106.
50. Id. at 19, 370 S.E.2d at 105.

51. See id. at 19-21, 370 S.E.2d at 106.
52. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-550 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
53. See Hudson, 296 S.C. at 19-20, 370 S.E.2d at 105-06.
54. Id. at 23, 370 S.E.2d at 107 (quoting Fisher v. South Carolina Dep't of Mental
Retardation, 277 S.C. 573, 575, 291 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1982)).

55. Id.
56. Id. at 20, 370 S.E.2d at 106.
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tion claim after reaching an out-of-court settlement with a third-party
tortfeasor. The supreme court held that a claimant has three options:
(1) collect from the employer-carrier only, and let the employer seek
reimbursement from the third party; (2) sue the tortfeasor only; or (3)
proceed against both parties.5 7 Based on Hudson's failure to comply
with section 42-1-560 notice requirements, the court of appeals deduced that she had elected to sue only the tortfeasor Dismissing without comment the claimant's observation that election of remedies is
not addressed by the South Carolina statute, 8 the court construed the
notice requirement to be applicable to all third-party actions, "irrespective of whether an employee pursues a third-party action either
before or simultaneously with filing a workers' compensation claim.""9
Although the court implied that the question of prejudice to the employer and insurance carrier was not relevant to its decision, the language of the opinion reflects the court's concern that the employer's
subrogation rights could be forfeited as a result of a unilateral decision
by the employee.6
Aware of the modern trend of courts to view election of remedies
as "foreign to the spirit and purpose of compensation legislation,"'1 the
court of appeals viewed the circuit court's decision, which made the
rights of the employer and carrier dependent upon the timing of the
employee's workers' compensation and third-party claims, 6 as no less
"smacking" of medieval legalism.6 3 Requiring claimants to affirmatively protect the employer-carrier's subrogation rights by providing
notice of the suit merely promotes the goal of equity to all parties. The
burden of the requirement is lessened, the court observed, by the
"meaningful assistance" the employer-carrier can provide to the em64
ployee in prosecuting the suit.
Hudson is significant for three principal reasons. First, it carries
Johnson v. Pennsylvania Millers Mutual Insurance Co. to its logical

57. Fisher, 277 S.C. at 575, 291 S.E.2d at 201.
58. The court undoubtedly was influenced by the following observation made by
the supreme court in Fisher.

While § 42-1-560 does not specifically state that settlement with a third party
without the carrier's consent constitutes an election of remedies, it is clear
from a reading of the statute that the legislature did not intend for a claimant
to settle his third party case without regard to the employer's rights for subrogation under § 42-1-550 and still maintain a workmen's compensation claim.

Id.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Hudson, 296 S.C. at 20, 370 S.E.2d at 106.
See id. at 23, 370 S.E.2d at 107-08.
2A A. LARsoN, supra note 19, § 73.30.
Hudson, 296 S.C. at 23, 370 S.E.2d at 107-08.
See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 19, § 73.30.
Hudson, 296 S.C. at 22, 370 S.E.2d at 107.
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conclusion: workers' compensation claims are barred if the notice requirement is not met. Second, the decision indicates a belief by the
court that policy considerations encouraging liberal application of
workers' compensation laws must be balanced by the employer-carrier's right to reduce costs through participation in third-party actions.
The presumption that employer-carriers' interests are equal to employees' interests demonstrates the unwillingness of South Carolina courts
"'to allow the employee to demand compensation from the employer
after having destroyed the employer's normal right to obtain reimbursement from the third party.' ",5 The decision, though, is not as
draconian as it may initially appear. Unlike antiquated election doctrines that required "the injured employee. . . to hazard his substantive rights on an election between claiming compensation and suing a
third-party tortfeasor, ' '8 Hudson allows the claimant to preserve both
remedies by meeting the relatively simple notice requirements of section 42-1-560.
Finally, the decision shifts the rights and responsibilities of the
participants in the workers' compensation system. Employers and their
insurance carriers are protected from liability in cases in which their
subrogation rights have been effectively foreclosed by actions to which
they were not a party. The burden of this additional employer protection, however, is not shifted to employees. Instead, it will be borne
largely by unsuccessful plaintiffs' attorneys who, having been put on
notice by the court, may find themselves subject to malpractice actions
for failure to preserve their clients' workers' compensation claims.
Kenneth J. Mitteldorf

65. Fisher, 277 S.C. at 575-76, 291 S.E.2d at 201 (quoting Stroy v. MiUwood Drug
Store, 235 S.C. 52, 59, 109 S.E.2d 706, 709 (1959)).
66. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 19, § 73.00.
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